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ABSTRACT 
Since the middle 1980's, as consequence of the worldwide process of liberalization, 
there has been an important rise in international capital flows, especially Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI). In particular, during the second half of 1990’s, worldwide FDI 
inflows grew four times faster than domestic output, twice as fast as domestic 
investment and three times as fast as exports. However, the geographical distribution of 
these flows of international capital was highly uneven. The main receivers of these FDI 
inflows were the most-developed countries. The developing countries only received 
approximately 30% of the worldwide FDI inflows.  
At the same time, there has been a decrease in the speed of economic convergence 
among countries and regions. Between 1950 and 1990 the rate of convergence has been 
around 2% annually, but from the mid 1980’s, this rate decreased to the 0.2%-0.5% 
level on an annual basis. Immediately, a question arises: could the very high share of 
international capital directed to the most-developed countries, be one reason for the 
slowdown in the rate of economic convergence?. 
Most studies on the effects of the internationalization of production processes in 
economic growth have identified the liberalization process with international trade, 
excluding the effects of FDI and its consequences on regional convergence. However, 
the liberalization process has increased not only trade, but also international capital 
flows. In this paper we address this last point. The main objective is to analyze the 
possible relationship among FDI and economic convergence. In particular, we present 
arguments which support the hypothesis that FDI inflows could be one of the elements 
helping to slowdown the speed of convergence in recent years.  
We show, on one hand, that FDI is an "engine of growth", the same as international 
trade. The main reason is that FDI is not merely a transfer of capital. FDI contributes to   2
strengthening the economic structure on the host country, modernizes and 
internationalises it as well. FDI is usually accompanied by specific intangible assets of 
the transnational corporation, changes in production systems and/or technological 
innovations, among others. There is not doubt that all these factors generate positive 
growth effects in the target destination. 
On the other hand, we show that the main receivers of this FDI are not the developing 
countries. The developed countries, with more than two-thirds of the worldwide FDI 
inflows dominate the global picture. 
So, if these facts are analysed together, it is possible to show that the positive effects of 
FDI on economic growth are concentrated mainly in the most developed countries. 




Over the last few years, there was a very important decrease in the speed of 
convergence among countries and among regions too. At the same time, many 
governments accelerated their liberalization process on international trade through 
commercial agreements, involving bilateral or multilateral agreements in foreign 
investments too. Such is the case of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the 
ASEAN Investment Area, in Asia, or the Organization of African States. As result, 
international inflows of Foreign Direct investment (FDI
11) grew at rates never been seen 
before. Since the mid 1980s, -with the only exception of the period 1991-1992-, the 
worldwide inflow of FDI reached record levels each year. The annual growth rates of 
FDI were considerably higher than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or the Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF). Only the general economic situation in 2001 braked 
this trend.  
This increase in the worldwide flow of FDI and this decrease in the speed of 
convergence explains the growing interest among the international scientific community 
                                                 
1 According to the UNCTAD, FDI inflows are comprised of capital received from an FDI enterprise by a 
foreign direct investor. There are three components in FDI: equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra- 
company loans.   3
-and among politicians too- in analysing their causes and their effects, and the possible 
linkages between both. The main reason for such interest is that FDI is usually 
considered as an “engine of growth” and could be used as intermediate variable in 
economic policy in achieving long-term and sustained growth. Although the debate on 
the costs and benefits of FDI for the receiving countries has not yet concluded, the idea 
that FDI can be an “engine of growth” has been widely accepted. FDI is not merely seen 
as an external source of financing the growth of an economy. Indeed, FDI does not 
merely contribute to strengthening the economic structure, but also modernizes and 
internationalises it as well. Furthermore, FDI is not merely a transfer of capital, but is 
generally accompanied by a series of specific intangible assets of the transnational 
corporation. The changes in production systems, the new managerial methods, the 
technological innovations, the know-how, and the greater capacity for innovation, are 
just a few of the quality aspects of FDI. All these generate positive effects on growth in 
the target destination. The main reason is that resident national companies increase their 
productions thanks to the spillovers that  incoming multinational companies generate. 
Indeed, FDI is another important factor that helps the receiving economies to grow. 
That explains why not only developing countries but even developed countries compete 
fiercely for such investments.  
However, in this “struggle” to appear “more attractive” to foreign investors, and thus to 
achieve the greatest quota possible of this international flow of capital, the great winners 
continue being the most developed countries. Indeed, they have been receiving more 
than 80% of the global inflows of FDI, a higher percentage than they contribute to the 
world’s GDP. Moreover, this international distribution of FDI continues to remain 
highly uneven. So, it is easy to deduce that -if the principal receivers of FDI are the 
most developed countries-, then the positive effects for economic growth are also 
concentrated in these developed countries. Therefore –and obviously-, FDI could be one 
factor witch could explain the brake in the “economic convergence process” during the 
last years
2. The main reason is that the developing  countries are not receiving the 
                                                 
2 The rhythm of regional convergence in Europe between 1950 and 1990 has been relatively low, inferior 
to 2% annual, and has decreased considerably from the mid 1980s, with rates between the 0,2 and 0,5% 
annual. See, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Martin (2001).    4
technological and productive capacity that the more developed countries are indeed 
receiving.  
This paper is the first step into the analysis of the possible negative effects of FDI 
inflows on regional convergence. The main objective of this paper is to present 
arguments, which sustain the hypothesis that FDI inflows can be one of the elements 
helping to brake the speed of the convergence in the last years. In particular, we present 
two kinds of arguments: On one hand, theoretical arguments; on the other hand, the 
facts. To do so, the paper is structured as follows: After this introduction, we briefly 
review the literature on the possible relationships between FDI and economic growth, 
and their possible implications for economic convergence. At the same time, we present 
a new model which explains the negative effect of FDI inflows on the speed of 
convergence. In Section 3, we present the economic data, showing the growth of 
worldwide FDI and the trend towards concentration into developed countries. These 
two facts, support the theoretical model. Section 4 offers some of the possible political 
solutions that may be applied. The final section then presents the main conclusions that 
can be drawn from our study.  
 
2. THE THEORIES 
Ever since A. Smith published The Wealth of Nations, most of the economists interested 
in economic development and growth, defend the hypothesis that countries that adopt an 
internationally open commercial strategy achieve greater economic growth than those 
that close their doors to foreign trade. Although such opening strategies initially 
envisaged only international trade, in the last years, international transfer of capital has 
been added to the list of market-opening strategies. International capital transfers started 
in the form of the extension of external credit. The main reason was that external credit 
could be a source for financing national structural reforms and the formation of capital. 
But external credit was gradually replaced by FDI inflows. FDI was regarded as a 
superior source of national economic growth. There are several studies that analyse this 
connection between FDI inflows
3 and economic growth. In general terms, it was 
assumed that it is a fairly complex phenomenon, but it is generally accepted that FDI 
                                                 
3 See, among others, Wei,1995; Balasubramanyam et al., (1996), and de Mello (1997).   5
can affect economic growth in host countries because FDI represents “the transmission 
to the host country of a package of capital, managerial skills, and technical skills” 
(Johnson, 1972, p.2). In particular, some of the main reasons for this linkage are the 
followings: 
•  We can not forget that FDI is essentially investment, that is, a transfer of capital 
between countries. The whole FDI cannot be considered as being synonymous 
with GFCF, since the acquisition of already existing companies and long-term 
loans are also included in FDI inflows. However, an important part of FDI is 
new investment, such as the establishment of new companies and the expansion 
of already existing ones. This is the so-called  Greenfield investment, which 
increases national stock of capital, and so, is a source of growth (Díaz 
Vázquez,2003). 
•  Usually this transfer of capital might be accompanied by technological 
improvements that affect the total production of the foreign company, thanks to 
its specific assets (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2001). 
•  As a result, FDI could also improve the efficiency of the local companies in the 
host countries, not only through the spillovers that the investing company might 
generate, but also by generating a more intense competition between the already 
established local companies and the recently founded foreign company (Coe and 
Helpman,1995; Blomström and Kokko,1998; Buckley et al.,2002; among 
others). 
•  Thanks to this quality benefits, FDI could represent an important source of new 
technological improvements or an increase in the human capital for the 
developing countries and, thus, promote their growth and development. FDI 
could generate both short-term and long-term growth, not only in the neo-
classical sense growth, but also in the context of the new theories of endogenous 
growth (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996; Barrell y Pain, 1997; Ramírez, 2000; 
Buckley et al., 2002). 
•  Furthermore, the transnational companies have a strong capacity for export, 
which increases the degree of international opening up of the host economy,   6
increasing the benefits of international commercial liberalization (UNCTAD, 
1992). 
Indeed, in 1992, UNCTAD describes and explains the main ways and linkages through 
which the transnational companies could affect the growth processes of the host 
destinations. These are summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 1 
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Industrial upgrading 









Access to clean technology 
Links to local firms 
Source: World Investment Report 1992: Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth (UNCTAD). 
 
However, despite these general considerations that defend FDI as an additional source 
of growth -and, therefore, as being highly beneficial for developing countries-, the 
available literature on FDI and growth demonstrates that analysing the real effects of 
FDI on economic growth is not an easy task.  
In general, the main conclusion of previous studies, is that FDI inflows affects the 
economic growth in host countries. But the magnitude of this effect is uneven between 
countries. Many studies find that the productivity of such investments of foreign capital 
and, therefore, their benefits for national growth, depend on the original economic and 
technological conditions of the host country (Buckley et al., 2002). On this point, de 
Mello (1997) states that only if an acceptable level of human capital already exists in 
the host economy would FDI generate increases in productivity. Along these same lines,   7
Borensztein et al., (1998), demonstrate that only if a certain stock of human capital 
already exists could FDI be more productive than national investment. This is a very 
important result, because this implies that, with a same quantity and quality of FDI 
inflows, the effect on growth will be smaller in a developing country than in a 
developed country. 
To this problem, we must add the fact that there probably is a two-way causation 
between FDI and growth. Economic growth is not merely a result of FDI, but rather one 
of the main attractions for it. Goldberg (1972) states that American investments in the 
EEC countries were explainable by the growth of that market and Root and Ahmed 
(1979) demonstrate that the rate of GDP growth is one of the major attractions for 
investing in the developing countries. Culem (1988) also show that this variable is an 
important factor in determining bilateral flows of FDI between certain developed 
countries, including those of the European Community. Furthermore, Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (1994) and Díaz Vázquez et al., (1996), demonstrate that market size is 
the main determinant for attracting FDI to the Spanish economy. De Mello (1996) also 
demonstrates that the accumulation of capital and the growth of the Total Productivity 
Factor (TPF) have been the main attractors of FDI in Brazil, although, for the Chilean 
economy, he concludes that it is FDI that has generated the growth in output and TFP. 
Basu et al. (2003) demonstrate, using a panel of 23 developing countries that, for open 
economies, there is a two-way causal relationship between FDI and GDP, while for 
closed economies, fundamentally, it is economic growth that attracts inflows of FDI. 
This dilemma becomes even more complex when the possible effects of FDI inflows on 
economic convergence are analysed. To this point, we presented theoretical arguments 
that associate FDI inflows with the economic growth in host destinations, and we have 
shown FDI can certainly be an additional source of growth for the host economies. 
What then, are the implications of the “famous” convergence process to which the 
different economies are “theoretically” subjected? As we well know, the traditional 
neoclassical model for closed economies predicts convergence. The assumption of 
diminishing returns implies, automatically, that all the economies would tend to 
converge, in the sense that the less developed economies would grow more quickly than 
the most developed ones. The reason is that since the less developed economies would   8
have a stock of smaller capital than the more developed ones, according to the 
assumption of diminishing marginal returns in capital, the growth rate of the less 
developed economies would be greater than that of the more developed ones, so that 
convergence would be guaranteed. Furthermore, this convergence should take place 
independently of whether all of the economies have the same kind of technologies, the 
same rate of savings or the same population growth. Even in such cases, the traditional 
neoclassical model predicts conditional convergence
4. This, however, is not what the 
endogenous single-sector growth models predict, since they do not consider the 
assumption of diminishing marginal returns in production factors.  
The inclusion of international mobility of capital in either approach does not alter the 
results significantly. In the neoclassical model, convergence would continue to exist, 
since, assuming perfect mobility of capital among countries, there would be movements 
of capital from the more developed economies to the less developed ones. However, this 
has not happened in our economies. Developed countries are the major receivers of this 
FDI inflows. So, they are also the ones that show the greatest increase in foreign capital 
stock, experiencing a higher growth rate than they would supposedly have had without 
such inflows of FDI.  
Obviously, when the growth rates of the developed countries increase, the real trend 
towards economic convergence is obviously broken. When we add to this situation the 
supposition that the effect of FDI on growth is positively related to the technological 
and economic situation of the host destination, the obstacles to economic convergence 
among the different economies is even greater. 
Nor do we see any immediate possibility of  “eliminating” this “brake” effect on 
convergence due to FDI being funnelled into the more developed economies. The 
spread of technology, another positive effect of FDI on economic growth, can also be 
negative for convergence, since FDI is concentrated in the countries that are generating 
such new technology. The possibility of the lesser-developed countries (the followers) 
imitating the technological advances of the more developed ones (the leaders) could 
allow a theoretical convergence even in the endogenous growth models (Barro and Sala-
                                                 
4 See, among others, Barro and Sala-i Martín (1991 and 1992); and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).   9
i-Martin, 1994). Such an imitation process, however, is also limited when the exchange 
of technology via FDI is also concentrated in the same developed countries.  
All these hypotheses and their implications can be put more clearly into analytical 
perspective. We propose a new model. The question is not whether the model predicts 
or does not predict convergence. The question here is to analyse how the speed of 
convergence can be modified by FDI inflows. So, the starting point will never be either 
the traditional Solow’s model with mobility of capital -because the capital is not 
flowing from the more to the less developed countries-, or the models of endogenous 
growth -because although technology diffusion exists, this would take place among 
developed countries, and not from the more ones to the less ones-. 
We consider initially closed economies, without international movements of capital. We 


































d 1 α α       [ 1 ]  
where 
+ Y  represents the income or the GDP of the developed countries, and 
− Y  that of 
the developing ones. 









d  would 
be equal to zero. As such, the variation of this ratio would depends, on the one hand, 
how far the less developed economies find themselves from the more developed ones. 
Implicitly, we are assuming one of the main results of the Solow’s model. In a closed 





















d  would trend to increase, that is, the 
developing countries would approach to the developed countries. There is a trend to the 




d  depends on α  too, and α  is 
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d  will also be positive, which means that the differential of the   10











 does not only depend on how far are the developed economies from 























equilibrium, this ratio would be equal to one, and there would be complete convergence, 









Y . On the other hand, if α  is negative, there will be a 

















 is positive. 
If we consider capital movements, according to the empirical evidence about the effects 
of FDI inflows on growth, this model is able to represent the effects on the speed of the 
convergence. 













































d 1 α α    [2] 
where the sub-index FDI refers to the fact that we are now supposing that the economies 
receive FDI inflows that affect their growth and, as such, the level of their income or 
GDP alters.  
So, assuming that FDI generates growth, if FDI is concentrated in the developed 
countries, the growth of this developed economies will be more affected than that of the 
developing ones, because of the effect of the unequal inflows of FDI. As such, although 
both 
− − dY dYFDI f  and 


















































FDI p , then, by force,  α α p FDI ).   11
Even when we assume a priori that absolute convergence exists, (α  positive), the 
concentration of FDI inflows in the developed countries would certainly slow down the 
rate of the convergence. 
However, if the FDI inflows are concentrated on developing countries, we can find that 










Y . But we must 
remember that, according to Buckley et al., (2002), Borensztein et al., (1998) or de 
Mello (1997), this could not be always true, because the effect of FDI on growth 
depends on the state of technology of the host country. So, the effect of FDI inflows on 
economic convergence when this flows are concentrated on developing countries 
depends, by one hand, on the effect on growth of FDI and, by another hand, on the 
technological gap between developed and developing countries. 
 
3. THE FACTS 
The main argument that we have employed, so far, could be summarized as follows: 
FDI seems to have positive effects on economic growth, but, in relation to economic 
convergence, such positive results depend on where the investments are channelled. If 
FDI goes to the developing countries, economic convergence could exist, not only 
through an increase in capital stock, but also as a result of an increase in the 
productivity of the local companies in the host destination -thanks to the incorporation 
of technological advances-, but this is not sure. However, if FDI is concentrated in the 
more developed countries, we can affirm that there are no positive effects on economic 
convergence, since both the increase in capital stock and the spread of technology will 
also be concentrated in the more developed countries. So, in order to know the possible 
effects of FDI on economic convergence in our economies, the first step must be the 
study of the allocation of FDI inflows. This is the aim of this section. We will show that 
the data support one of the hypothesis of our analytical model: high degree of 
concentration of FDI inflows on developed countries. So, from the analytical model, the 
negative effects on economic convergence will be an obvious result.  
   12
Table 2 
Selected Indicators of FDI and International Production (I) 
Value at current prices 
(In billons of dollars) 
  1982 1990 2000 2001 
      
FDI inflows   59  203  1,271  735 
FDI inward stock  734  1.874  6.314  6.846 
Cross border M&As   …  151  1,144  601 
Sales of foreign affiliates  2,541  5,479  15,680  18,517 
Gross product of foreign affiliates  594  1,423  3,167  3,495 
Employment of foreign affiliates 
(in thousands)  17,987 23,858 45,587 53,581 
GDP (in current prices)  10,805  21,672  31,895  31,900 
Gross fixed capital formation  2,285  4,841  6,466  6,680 
Export of goods and non-factor 
services  2,081 4,375 7,036 7,430 
      
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001 and World Investment Report 2002. 
 
Table 3 
Selected Indicators of FDI and International Production (II) 







2000  2000 2001 
          
FDI inflows   23.6  20.0  40.1  37.1  -50.7 
FDI inward stock  15.6  9.1  17.9  22.2  9.4 
Cross border M&As   26.4  23.3  49.8  49.3  -47.5 
Sales of foreign affiliates  16.9  10.5  14.5  15.1  9.2 
Gross product of foreign affiliates  18.8  6.7  12.9  32.9  8.3 
Employment of foreign affiliates  6.8  5.1  11.7  10.2  7.1 
GDP (in current prices)  11.5  6.5  1.2  2.5  2.0 
Gross fixed capital formation  13.9  5.0  1.3  3.3  ... 
Exports of goods and non-factor 
services  15.8 8.7 4.2  11.7  -5.4 
         
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002. 
 
The current boom in FDI inflows suggests, that this capital movement is becoming a 
more significant element in the world economy. Despite the global decline in 2001 and   13
2002, FDI inflows continue to be a driving force of the globalization process. The 
growing paper of FDI inflows can be seen in the increase in the worldwide FDI stock 
and the growth in the gross product, employment and sales of foreign affiliates of 
transnational corporations (tables 2 and 3).  
As the data show, the worldwide FDI inflows have been clearly growing since the mid 
1980s. Only the economic crisis of the early nineties and the economic situation in 2001 
braked this trend. Despite these brief periods, however, it has been growing at a faster 
rate owing to other important macroeconomic variables like the GDP, the GFCF or even 
international trade. Indeed, it has moved from being 0.5% of the world’s GDP in 1982 
to represent 4% in 2000. With regard to GFCF, its contribution has increased from 2.6% 
to 19.7% in less than twenty years. At present, the total output generated by affiliated 
companies represents more than 10% of the global production. 
The principal beneficiaries of this spectacular growth in FDI over the last few years, 
however, have been precisely the most developed countries, in both relative and 
absolute terms, as figures 1 and 2 show.  
 
Figure 1 
Evolution FDI Inflows 
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Source: The author, based on the UNCTAD FDI database.   14
Figure 2 
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Source: The author, based on the UNCTAD FDI database. 
 
 
In figure 1, we can see clearly that the great majority of the international flow of FDI 
from the late nineties on, was allocated to the most developed countries in the world. 
Indeed, it is precisely the growth in the inflows of foreign capital to these countries that 
is now encouraging more FDI worldwide. 
With regard to its distribution, however, the current pattern seen in FDI flows seems to 
have great repercussions for international economic convergence. Up to 1997 the 
importance of FDI inflows, in terms of GFCF, was relatively significant for the less 
developed countries. In fact, such flows tended to be higher than the world average. 
From 1997 onwards, however, this tendency begins to regress, with a remarkable 
increase in FDI in relation to GFCF being seen in the more developed countries, while 
the relationship stays constant in the less developed countries. In the year 2000, in fact 
the most developed countries were the only ones that did not see a drop in their 
contribution.  
This, therefore, seems to be the crux of the matter. Throughout the first half of the 
nineties, FDI could be considered to have been an important source of growth for the   15
less developed countries, which were receiving considerably important flows of FDI in 
both relative and absolute terms. The increases in their capital stock and technological 
advances contributed greatly to their economic take off, and seemed to be providing a 
natural approach to economic convergence between the more developed countries and 
the less developed ones. However, with the spectacular growth seen in FDI flows to the 
more developed countries towards the end of the nineties, the less developed countries 
lose their coveted place in the international distribution of FDI and, indeed, become the 
great losers. FDI ceases to be the important source of economic growth for them that it 
used to be and is now directed towards the more developed countries, where we see 
greater technological exchanges and increases in capital stock taking place. These 
countries already had enormous economic and technical advantages over the less 
developed countries. The less developed countries have thus lost an important source of 
economic growth that would have helped them to approach convergence with the more 
developed ones.  
 
Figure 3 















































































Developing countries Central and Eastern Europe
 
Source: The author, based on the UNCTAD FDI database. 
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The less developed countries’ loss of attraction for international FDI and the negative 
consequences that this could have for global economic convergence is obvious from 
figure 3. We clearly see a great rise in FDI per capita in the more developed countries at 
the end of the nineties, although this indicator was already considerably higher for them 
than it was for the less developed countries whose status has hardly changed 
significantly. In fact, the differences between the developed and the developing 
countries, in this sense, have increased over time. Only the economic situation in 2001, 
which represented a terrible shock to international investment, altered this trend.  
 
Table 4 














Latin America and the Caribbean 
South America 




South, East and South-East Asia 
East and South-East Asia 
South Asia 
The Pacific 























Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002. 
(*) Including Australia, Israel, Japan and New Zeeland. 
 
There is another important indicator that measures these great global inequalities and it 
demonstrates the possible negative effects that FDI has on economic convergence: i.e.,   17
the Inward FDI Performance Index, compiled by the UNCTAD. This index is the ratio 
of a country’s share in global FDI inflows, to its share in global GDP. It is implicitly 
assumed, that FDI should be distributed automatically and always proportionately to the 
size of the economies (measured by their GDP). Otherwise, it would imply that there 
are other factors that alter (positively or negatively) the initial plans of foreign 
investment, such as political and macro-economic uncertainty, access to natural 
resources, human capital or infra-structure, among other things. As such, when a 
country has a rate higher than one in this index, it implies that it has a series of 
characteristics that make it more attractive for FDI than others that have a rate that is 
lower than one. Table 4 illustrates this quite clearly.  
In general terms, the differences seen between the more and the less developed 
countries are highly significant. The countries of the European Union have the highest 
scores, while the lowest are seen for West and South Asia. Certain developed countries 
like Japan, for instance, appear under the heading of “Other developed countries”, and 
their low scores are explained by the fact that they have traditionally been closed to 
inflows of FDI. The relatively high levels of FDI inflows to Latin America and Hong 
Kong (China) make the average score for the developing countries come close to one. In 
fact, there are important differences within the group of developing countries. Just 5 of 
these countries account for over 50% the total inflows of FDI to the developing 
countries, and 10 most important absorb more than 80% of the total. 
Furthermore, we must not forget that FDI is very sensitive to short-term factors (which 
has been demonstrated by the sharp drop seen in the year 2001), which means that the 
international distribution of FDI is also significantly affected by small events. The case 
of Angola is particularly significant. Its recent climate of relative political stability has 
attracted important transfers of FDI to its petroleum industry, giving the country a score 
of over 5 and ranking it as the third most attractive country for FDI when just ten years 
ago it was number 129. But the important point here is that the majority of these less 
developed countries that are not now receiving significant amounts of FDI have little 
hope of receiving such foreign capital either on the short term or on the long term.   18
According to the Inward FDI Potential Index
5, compiled by the UNCTAD, the poorer 
countries are “trapped” within a category countries with little potential to attract FDI, 
while they are now receiving very low levels of it because of their “small” economic 
weight. 
These facts all have important implications for global economic convergence. 
 
Figure 4 
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Source: The author, from UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002. 
 
As can be seen, the difference between the growth rates of the more and the less 
developed countries is quite striking. While the less developed nations are showing a 
tendency to stagnate with growth rates around 5%, in the more developed ones the 
tendency is to increase their growth rates, bringing them nearer to those of the 
developing countries. The year 2000 is outstanding for its record volume of FDI 
transfers, most of which was directed to the more developed countries. If the growth 
                                                 
5 Estimated from a set of eight structural economic factors that are relatively constant over time. 
Specifically, these variables are: GDP per capita, real GDP growth, exports as percentage of GDP, 
number of telephone lines per 1,000 habitants, commercial energy use per capita, R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of gross national income, students in tertiary education as a percentage of total population and 
country risk.   19
rates of the less developed economies begin to stagnate while those of the more 
developed ones continue to rise, any process of economic convergence between the two 
groups will obviously be curtailed.  
 
4. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EFFECTS OF FDI ON ECONOMIC 
CONVERGENCE 
In the face of the growing importance of the international flows of FDI in recent years, 
their positive effects on the growth of the receiving economies and their negative effects 
on global economic convergence due to the observed pattern of international 
distribution, the need arises to consider new political focuses. If what we really wish to 
pursue, is a harmonious and global development of the world’s economies as a whole, 
this would require a structural change in the very perception of the FDI phenomenon as 
well as the designing of new strategies of international distribution.  
On one hand, we must admit that the international flows of FDI are playing an 
important role in the opening up and globalisation of many different economies, as we 
have seen in international trade, so that the debates on topics like internationalisation 
and the effects of external economies, among other topics, should not be limited to the 
analysis of either international flows of goods or services, but rather should consider all 
of these factors as a whole.  
Table 5 
International Regulatory Changes 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Number of countries that 
introduced changes in their 
investment regimes 
35 43 57 49 64 65 76 60 63 69 71 
Number of regulatory changes 
introduced in the investment 
regimes of the different 
countries 
82  79  102 110 112 114 151 145 140 150 208 
More  favourable  to  FDI    80  79  101 108 106  98  135 136 131 147 194 
Less favourable to FDI   2  -  1  2  6  16  16  9  9  3  14 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002. 
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It implies a multilateral revision of the different national policies that affect FDI, just as 
GATT has recently revised policies on international trade. Fortunately, the most recent 
initiatives carried out in this field seem to be moving in that direction, as can be 
appreciated from the table 5, although a lot still remains to be done. 
Due to the unequal international distribution of the FDI, however, there is an urgent 
need for an international consensus on political strategies that ensure with high-priority, 
that FDI is also directed to the less developed countries. As such, the individual and 
arbitrary performance of the countries that wish to participate in these flows of FDI 
would be avoided, thus limiting the unequal “battles” that take place among certain 
countries to be the destination of such inflows.  
Their strategies should not only envisage quantitative aspects but qualitative ones as 
well. They should consider foreign investment, international credit or any other sort of 
foreign aid. These should be all analysed together with the possible flows of capital, 
goods, services or technology.  
Any multi-lateral focus that is adopted should also consider the regional economic 
aspects that exist within each nation. The reason for this is that, just as FDI is 
concentrated in the most developed countries, a similar concentration of this FDI also 
exists in the most developed regions of these countries. The unequal distribution of FDI 
is not merely an international phenomenon but a regional one as well and is 
endangering regional convergence within the target economies.  
Indeed, FDI should not be seen as a mere compensating instrument for a country’s 
negative balances of payments. Far from being considered as a short-term investment-
type portfolio, is must be considered a part of a long-term investment strategy, with the 
permanent objective of increasing the production level of the receiving countries. This 
concept should be kept in mind when any sort of national or international policies on 
FDI are being designed.  
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout the nineties, the international flows of FDI have been reaching bench-mark 
levels that would have been unthinkable a decade earlier. The greater liberalization 
seen, not only in capital markets, but in international trade as well, has been the main   21
cause for this massive inflow of foreign capital to so many different economies. 
According to the figures shown in this paper, the international distribution of these 
flows, however, clearly favours the more developed economies. There is not only 
remarkable divergence among the more and the less developed countries, but also 
within them, and the differences are only getting wider. In this paper we presented 
arguments and maintain that the above-cited factors, help to explain the growing gulf 
between the rich and the poor countries.  
The transnational corporations, which are the main catalysts of FDI, provide a series of 
tangible and intangible assets that complement domestic investment and, as such, 
generate positive effects in terms of economic growth. However, their concentration in 
the more developed countries implies that they are the main beneficiaries in economic 
terms. The analytical model and the data presented here serve to offer a new explanation 
of the gulf between the more and the less developed countries. The current allocation of 
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